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It may be optimal from a welfare perspective to use R&D subsidies
when the source of R&D distortions originates from the surplus appro-
priability problem and technological spillovers in the form of knowl-
edge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication externalities are
absent. Hence, R&D subsidies may constitute the optimal policy
even when subsidies directly targeted on monopoly pricing could be
applied. The result holds when dynamic eﬀects are important relative
to static eﬀects and when governments spending is restricted. The
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1 Introduction
This paper argues that it may be optimal from a welfare perspective to di-
rectly subsidize R&D activities when the source of R&D distortions mainly
originates from the surplus appropriability problem and technological spillovers
in the form of knowledge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication ex-
ternalities are negligible or absent. The result holds when two conditions are
satisfied: (1) dynamic eﬀects are important relative to static eﬀects and (2)
government spending is below the required eﬀort for correcting completely for
R&D distortions. The surplus appropriability problem means that innova-
tors are unable to appropriate the full social gain associated with innovations
even in the case without technological spillovers. Prices are determined as
constant mark-up over costs, which distort sales downwards, implying that
the R&D incentive is too low from a social point of view.
It is often argued that the decentralized economy underinvests in R&D
relatively to what is socially optimal. Jones and Williams (2000) reach this
conclusion by evaluating the net-eﬀect of a number of R&D distortions. The
analysis is based on calibrations of an endogenous growth model for the US
economy. Two groups of imperfections are potentially relevant for R&D
activities. These are distortions directly related to the production of ideas
(knowledge spillovers in research, externalities associated with duplication,
and creative destruction) and distortions related to market power in the
sector that captures surplus generated by ownership of innovations (surplus
appropriability problem). Moreover, by internalizing individual distortions
one at a time, it is found that the main force promoting underinvestment in
R&D comes from the surplus appropriability problem.
Underinvestments in R&D call for policy interventions. An important
statement in this relation is that governments do not provide enough support
for R&D activities to correct fully for distortions. Jones and Williams (1998)
link the theoretical models of new growth theory to the empirical literature
estimating private and social returns to R&D and argue that the optimal level
of R&D expenditures are at least four times higher than the actual level in
the US economy. The analysis thus establishes that government policies are
unsuccessful in bringing the decentralized economy to the social equilibrium.
This suggests that government spending is restricted, which is the case when
a government is unable or unwilling to use the level of spending required to
implement the optimum policy.
As for the US economy it seems likely that European governments also are
unsuccessful in bringing the economies to the social equilibrium. According
to the Barcelona objective the average research investment level should be
increased from 1.8% of GDP in 2002 to 3% of GDP by 2010, of which 1/3
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should be funded by governments. According to OECD (2005), government
funding amounted to around one third on average for countries in the Euro-
pean Union for 2002. For comparison, gross domestic expenditure on R&D
amounted to 2.6% as a percentage of GDP for the United States of which
government funding constituted about 1/3.
To sum up, three characteristics are important for R&D: first, the socially
optimal level of R&D investments is above the outcome in the decentralized
economy; second, existing R&D policies do not bring economies to the so-
cial optimum; and third, the primary cause for underinvestments in R&D
comes from the surplus appropriability problem. This motivates the main
question addressed in this paper. What are the welfare eﬀects of applying
R&D subsidies to correct for distortions created by market power instead of
instruments that deals with the market failure as directly as possible when
government spending is relatively low compared to the eﬀort required to im-
plement the optimum policy. The analysis is taken to the extreme case where
technological spillovers are absent. Consequently, the analysis investigates
welfare eﬀects of policy instruments used to remedy distortions from market
power in firms that use blueprints developed by R&D activities as input in
production activities. The issue is interesting because in contrast to techno-
logical spillovers where R&D taxes-cum-subsidies are the direct instruments,
the policy instruments that the government should use dealing with market
power are not obvious a priori.
As mentioned, the focus is economic policy under restricted government
spending. Therefore, the exact mechanisms causing the restriction are not
modeled formally and are not expected to change the main result if included.
However, one can think of a number causing mechanisms. Restricted govern-
ment spending may be a consequence of marginal costs of public funds above
one, which may be due to distortional income taxes or distributional consid-
erations, see for example Neary (1994). Alternatively, the government may
not want to tax voters too heavily because they punish public expenditure,
see for example Peltzman (1992).
The analysis is related to the literature on marginal cost of public funds,
where alternative taxes for financing the same amount of government spend-
ing are compared under the diﬀerential analysis, see for example Ballard
(1990) and Håkonsen (1998). This type of analysis investigates the eﬃ-
ciency eﬀects of financing public expenditures, while the eﬀects of govern-
ment spending are of no concern. In this paper, the eﬃciency eﬀects of
government spending is investigated, while the eﬀects of public finance are
of no concern.
The applied model is a simple semi-endogenous growth model, see Jones
(1995). The production side of the economy is divided into three sectors.
2
Final goods are produced by a composite of labor and intermediate goods,
where the latter input factor is composed of specialized intermediate inputs.
Intermediate inputs are produced converting final goods into intermediate
varieties, whereas innovation takes place in a separate sector using labor
input. To make the analysis as focused as possible, technological spillovers
are assumed to be absent.
When a new design is developed, the patent is sold to an intermediate
firm. Patents secure property rights, and technological progress is a result
of market driven innovation. Market power for intermediate firms is accord-
ingly needed to ensure demand for new designs, and monopolistic competition
is assumed to prevail in the intermediate sector. This assumption generates
an imperfection that calls for welfare improving policy interventions. Perfect
competition takes place in the rest of the economy.
The only distortion in the model is monopoly pricing in the intermediate
sector. This distortion implies that the demand for intermediate varieties is
below the social optimal level. An indirect consequence is that the incentive
to innovate is below the social optimal level because low intermediate demand
in the market economy leads to low profits. Since the R&D incentive is
related to private profits, low intermediate demand depresses the incentive.
This is an important relationship since monopoly pricing, which directly
generates static ineﬃciency in the intermediate sector, indirectly generates
dynamic ineﬃciency.
A subsidy to intermediate goods production is a direct policy instrument
to correct for monopoly pricing. This subsidy aﬀects the static distortion
only, leaving the R&D incentive unaﬀected and corrects completely for the
monopoly distortion and makes firms price according to marginal costs, pro-
vided that the optimal subsidy level can be financed through lump-sum taxa-
tion. As a consequence of the dynamic nature of the model, an R&D subsidy
is also a relevant policy instrument. Even though this subsidy is not tar-
geted directly on the source of the distortion and aﬀects the market price for
patents, the instrument does not introduce new distortions in the economy.
The reason is that blueprints for intermediate varieties are a specific input
to the intermediate sector.
The government can also use a third instrument; a subsidy to intermediate
purchase. This subsidy has an indirect eﬀect on incentive to innovate in
addition to the direct eﬀect on the static distortion. Hence, the instrument
produces a direct static gain and an indirect dynamic gain in eﬃciency. It
turns out that this instrument can be view as a combination of the two policy
instruments mentioned above. By using the optimal level of this instrument,
the government is able to simulate the economic outcome a social planner who
maximizes the utility of his representative household would choose. Hence,
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the government can implement the first-best policy using this instrument.
However, the level of government spending required to implement the optimal
rate of this direct instrument may be high.
Should a government use R&D subsidies, subsidies to intermediate pur-
chase or subsidies to intermediate production when government spending is
restricted? To answer this question, the welfare ranking of the subsidies is
studied for diﬀerent levels of government spending. It is established that
the R&D subsidy leads to higher welfare eﬀects under restricted government
spending when the dynamic gain is suﬃciently important compared to the
static gain. Hence, it may be optimal to focus entirely on the dynamic
ineﬃciency that arises from monopoly pricing. Also, it is established that
the welfare gain from focusing on the static or the dynamic imperfection
separately is higher that by using the instrument that have both static and
dynamic eﬀects under restricted government spending.
2 The Model
2.1 Final Goods
The underlying framework of the model follows Romer (1990) and Jones
(1995). Final goods are produced according to:
Y =
∙Z N
0
xj
αdj
¸
L1−αy , 0 < α < 1, (1)
where j ∈ [0, N ].1 Y is the quantity of final goods, xj is the intermediate
quantity of variety j, Ly is labor input in final goods production, N is the
stock of specialized intermediate inputs, and 1 − α is the value share of
labor. The aggregate quantity of intermediate goods equals
R N
0
xjdj, whereas
eﬀective intermediate input is given by the square bracket in (1). This
specification implies that the productivity of a given aggregate quantity of
intermediate goods increases with the number of specialized varieties.
Given the assumptions of perfect competition and profit-maximizing firms,
the demand for the j’th intermediate variety and labor are determined by:
xj = (α/pj)
1/(1−α)
Ly (2)
Ly = (1− α)Y/w, (3)
1To keep the analysis as simple as possible we use the production function from Romer
(1990). This function implicitly restricts the link between the markup, the capital share,
and consumer surplus, see Jones and Williams (2000) and Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth
(2005).
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where pj is the price of intermediate variety j and w is the wage rate. The
price of final goods is used as numeraire, i.e. pY = 1.
2.2 Intermediate Goods
To start business activities, the intermediate firm issues shares in order to
finance the patent that is required for production. Patents secure property
rights and monopolistic competition prevails in the intermediate goods sector.
Profits are accordingly paid to shareholders as dividends.
The intermediate firm possesses the property right to intermediate variety
j, and produces the specific variety by transforming final goods into inter-
mediates one-to-one. Hence, intermediate goods are perishables goods that
are depreciated fully within the period of production. This is diﬀerent from
Jones (1995) and Romer (1990) that treat intermediates as capital goods but
follows Grossman and Helpman (1991). This formulation is applied to make
the analysis more tractable. The producer of variety j maximizes profits
πxj = (pj − 1)xj,
subject to (2), and the price of intermediate variety j is accordingly deter-
mined by pj = p¯ = 1/α. Hence, the price of intermediate goods is the
same across varieties, which implies symmetric market clearing quantities
for intermediate goods
x¯ = α2/(1−α)Ly. (4)
Profits are thus identical for all producers of intermediate goods,
πj = π¯ = (1− α)α(1+α)/(1−α)Ly.
The usual non-arbitrage condition for shares in intermediate firms applies:
r =
p˙N
pN
+
π¯
pN
,
where pN is the patent price, and a dot above a variable indicates the time
derivative. The return to shares in intermediate firms is equal to the dividend
plus capital gains.
2.3 Innovation
New designs are produced using labor:
N˙ = δLN , (5)
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where LN is labor input in innovation. According to this formulation the
model is a semi-endogenous growth model, see Jones (1995). The applied
technology in innovation is simpler than that applied by Jones and Williams
(2000), which incorporates both replication eﬀects, creative destruction, and
knowledge spillover. To keep the analysis as clear-cut as possible, I only
introduce one distortion in the model.
Profit in innovation is zero due to perfect competition, implying that the
patent price equals:
pN = w/δ. (6)
Consequently, the non-arbitrage condition equals:
r =
π¯
pN
+ gN =
αδLy
N
+ gN (7)
where gN indicates the growth rate of N .
2.4 Household Sector
The household sector is characterized by a representative household with
an infinite time horizon. Intertemporal preferences are described by the
isoelastic utility integral:
U =
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−g)t
c1−θ − 1
1− θ dt. (8)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, θ > 0 is the inverse intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, g is exogenous population growth, and c is
consumption of final goods per capita, which equals aggregate consumption
divided by the population, i.e. c = C/L. Utility is maximized subject to the
dynamic budget constraint:
F˙ = wL+ rF − C, (9)
where F is aggregate financial capital.
The growth rate in consumption per capita is derived from the first-order
conditions with respect to c and f = F/L and is determined by:
gc = (r − ρ) /θ (10)
where gc indicates the growth rate of c. Finally, the transversality condition
limt→∞[atft] = 0 implies that r > 2g.
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2.5 Market Clearing
The equilibrium conditions for the N intermediate markets are already im-
posed on the model. The labor and final goods markets also have to
clear. The market clearing condition for final goods is derived from (9)
using F = NpN , (1), (3), (4), and (7):
C =
¡
1− α2
¢
α2α/(1−α)NLy (11)
It is assumed that a share u of labor is employed in the final goods sector,
whereas the remaining share (1− u) is employed in innovation, i.e. Ly = uL
and LN = (1− u)L. Finally, the market for patents clears according to
Walras’ Law.
3 Government Policy
Monopoly power generates a distortion in pricing of intermediate goods,
which calls for welfare improving policy interventions. In the following,
welfare eﬀects of policy interventions financed through domestic tax collec-
tion are investigated. Especially, I focus on the case of restricted government
spending. Hence, for some reason the government is unable or unwilling to
use the level of spending required to implement the optimum policy.2 In
the following, I analyze welfare eﬀects of subsidies to production and R&D
subsidies.
3.1 Instruments
The direct instrument to correct for monopoly power is a production subsidy
that covers a share of production costs, SX . For a given subsidy level, the
instrument lead to an intermediate price of:
p¯ = (1− SX) /α. (12)
The eﬀect of this instrument is an increase in the demand for intermediates.
This is a direct static eﬀect. The higher demand increases profits for inter-
mediate producers, and thereby the incentive to investments in innovation
activities. However, the higher intermediate demand also increases labor
demand and thereby the wage rate and patent price, see (6). The higher
patent price reduces the incentive to invest in innovations. The two opposite
2In a more subtle setup distorting taxes could be introduced. To make things as simple
as possible, I use the described ad hoc tax distortion.
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eﬀects on the incentive to innovate exactly cancel out, implying that direct
instrument does not aﬀect the allocation of labor between sectors. In other
words, the subsidy generates no R&D dynamic eﬀects.
The optimal subsidy level of production subsidy is SX = (1− α). For this
subsidy level, the distortion from monopoly pricing is fully eliminated and
the purchasing price for intermediates equals the marginal cost of production.
An R&D instrument is an R&D subsidy. This subsidy covers a cost share,
SI , of labor used in innovation activities and changes the price of patents in
(6) to:
pN = (1− SI)w/δ. (13)
This subsidy is targeted on the incentive to invest in R&D and therefore leads
a direct dynamic eﬀect. It is clear that this subsidy is an R&D instrument,
since it does not aﬀect the distortion from monopoly pricing directly but dis-
torts the patent price. Usually, R&D policy responses introduce unintended
distortions of incentives in other sectors of the economy. This is not the case
in the present setting because the stock of blueprints developed by R&D is a
sector-specific production factor implying that a changing patent price does
not aﬀect distortions in other parts of the economy.
The government could also use a third instrument, a subsidy to interme-
diate purchase. This subsidy deals directly with the monopoly distortion
by reducing the price of intermediate goods by covering a cost share of in-
termediate purchase. As for the production subsidy, this subsidy generates
opposite eﬀects on the incentive to innovate. In this case, however, the pos-
itive eﬀect on the rate of return dominates the negative cost eﬀect leading
to a higher incentive to invest in innovation. Hence, this version of the di-
rect instrument generates an R&D dynamic eﬀect in addition to the direct
static eﬀect. This instrument is a combination of the two above mentioned
subsidies with SX = SI . Hence, this instrument has the same eﬀect on the
incentive to innovate as the subsidy to R&D, i.e. the number of intermedi-
ate varieties N , and on the mark-up over marginal costs as the production
subsidy.
In the following, the analysis is mainly concerned with the production
subsidy and the R&D subsidy. In Section 5, welfare eﬀects from subsidizing
intermediate purchase is introduced.
3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady-state equilibrium the number of intermediate varieties grows by g.
This implies that Nj = δ (1− uj)L/g where j = I, X, denotes the type of
subsidy applied, see (5). As mentioned the production subsidy does not af-
8
fect the allocation of labor and thereby the number of intermediate varieties.
This implies that uX = (r − g) / (r − g + αg) and NX = αδL/ (r − g + αg).
Implementing the R&D subsidy and substitutingNI into the non-arbitrage
condition in (7) leads to (r − g) = π/pN = αg (uI/ (1− uI)) / (1− SI). Con-
sequently, the steady-state share of labor employed in final goods production
equals:
uI =
(1− SI) (r − g)
(1− SI) (r − g) + αg
, (14)
and the number of intermediate varieties follows
NI =
αδL
(1− SI) (r − g) + αg
. (15)
It can be shown that uI ≥ 1/2. The minimum value of uI applies when
r → 2g and SI = 1− α.
The optimal R&D subsidy, i.e. SI = (1− α), implies a steady-state num-
ber of intermediate varieties of NX = δL/r. By implementing the R&D
subsidy, the government ensures the full dynamic gain by correcting for the
misallocation of labor between final goods production and R&D. This sub-
sidy, however, leaves the static distortion from monopoly pricing unaﬀected.
I restrict the R&D subsidy to SI ∈ (0, 1− α), since the incentive to innovate
exceeds the social optimum when the R&D subsidy exceeds (1− α).
Since the optimal level of the production subsidy equals SX = (1− α) and
the optimal level of the R&D subsidy equals SI = (1− α), a subsidy to inter-
mediate purchase, i.e. a combination of the two subsidies under investigation,
equal to (1− α) fully eliminates the distortion from monopoly pricing and
increases the number of intermediate varieties to the optimal level. Using
this subsidy, the government is thus able to simulate the economic outcome
a social planner who maximizes the utility of his representative household
would choose. This is the first-best policy of the economy.
Finally, consumption per capita is determined. Under the production
subsidy this variable equals
cX = SEuXNX (16)
whereSE measures the static eﬀect on consumption from lower monopoly
distortion and
SE =
(1− α2 − SX)
(1− SX)
(1− SX)−α/(1−α) α2α/(1−α). (17)
The subsidy aﬀects consumption through two eﬀects on SE. First, the direct
static eﬀect of SX reduces the intermediate price and gives rise to higher use
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of the single intermediate variety. Second, a negative eﬀect from increasing
SX is generated through a higher level of government spending required to
implement the higher subsidy level.
Under the R&D subsidy, consumption per capita equals
cI =
¡
1− α2
¢
α2α/(1−α)uINI . (18)
This subsidy has a direct dynamic eﬀect working through a lower patent
price. The higher R&D incentive reallocates labor out of the final goods
sector and into R&D activities, i.e. uI falls, leading to a higher stock of
intermediate varieties, i.e. NI increases. The positive eﬀect on the number
of intermediate varieties dominates the negative eﬀect on the labor share in
final goods production, i.e. uINI increases. Hence, consumption is aﬀected
through an increase in uINI .3
The magnitude of the static gain compared to the magnitude of the dy-
namic gain can be summarized by:
Proposition 1 The dynamic eﬀect from a change in SI
(i) increases in the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ, and the
rate of time preferences, ρ, and
(ii) decreases in the population growth rate, g.
The static gain from a change in SX is not aﬀected by changes in θ, ρ or g.
Proof. The static eﬀect of a change in SX equals
∂ lnSE
∂ lnSX
=
1
(1− α) (1− SX)
− 1
(1− α2 − SX)
,
which is positive for SX < (1− α) and independent of g, θ, and ρ.
The elasticity of uINI with respect to SI equals
∂ lnuINI
∂ lnSI
=
SI
(1− SI)
(1− SI) (r − g)− αg
(1− SI) (r − g) + αg
,
which is positive for SI < (1− α). This elasticity depends positively on the
inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
∂2 lnuINI
∂ lnSI∂θ
=
2SIαg
2
((1− SI) (r − g) + αg)2
> 0,
3There is no static eﬀect on consumption from increasing tax revenue because the larger
tax payment is exactly oﬀset by the fall in the investment cost for intermediate firms. This
can be shown using the household budget constraint, see (9).
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positively on rate of time preference
∂2 lnuINI
∂ lnSI∂ρ
=
2SIαg
((1− SI) (r − g) + αg)2
> 0,
and negatively on population growth
∂2 lnuINI
∂ lnSI∂g
= − 2SIαρ
((1− SI) (r − g) + αg)2
< 0.
This proves Proposition 1.¤
The higher is the rate of time preferences, ρ, or the inverse intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, θ, the larger is the dynamic eﬀect of a subsidy.
Furthermore, the higher is population growth, the lower is the dynamic eﬀect.
The relationships follow from the non-arbitrage condition mentioned above.
(r − g) = π/pN can be reformulated to θ−1+ρ/g = (uI/ (1− uI)) / (1− SI).
Hence, a one percent increase in SI that results in a x-percent fall in (1− SI)
reduces uI/ (1− uI) by x percent. Hence, the share of labor employed in
final goods production falls, whereas the share increases in the R&D sector.
The higher is ρ or θ and the lower is g, the higher is the initial uI/ (1− uI).
Steady state consumption under the R&D subsidy can be formulated as
a positive function of uI (1− uI). It is easy to show that the percentage
increase in uI (1− uI) that follows from a percentage fall in uI/ (1− uI) is
larger for high uI/ (1− uI) values when uI ≥ 1/2, which is always the case.
Consequently, the total percentage eﬀect on uI (1− uI) from a change in SI
and thereby the eﬀect on uINI intensifies in θ and ρ, and diminishes in g.
3.3 Government Spending
Government spending per capita equal
BX/L = SXNXx/L
= α2SXα
2α/(1−α) (1− SX)−1/(1−α) uXNX (19)
under the production subsidy, whereas it equals
BI/L = SIw (1− uI)
= SI (1− α)α2α/(1−α) (1− uI)NI (20)
under the R&D subsidy. BX and BI denote levels of government spending
under the two policy instruments.
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Proposition 2 The level of government spending required to implement SX =
(1− α), measured in relation to final goods output equals BX/YX = α(1−α).
The level of government spending required to implement SI = (1− α), mea-
sured in relation to final goods output equals BI/YI = (1− α)2g/(r − g).
Proof. Final goods production equals
YX/L = (1− SX)−α/(1−α) α2α/(1−α)uXNX ,
after SX is implemented. The levels of government spending appear from
(19). Final goods production equals
YI/L = α
2α/(1−α)uINI ,
after SI is implemented. The level of government spending appears from
(20). Using SI = (1− α) and SX = (1− α) prove Proposition 2.¤
The implication of Proposition 2 is that BI/YI|SI=1−α < BX/YX|SX=1−α
for r/g > 1/α. Hence, the required level of government spending to imple-
ment the optimal subsidy level of the production subsidy exceeds that of the
R&D subsidy that completely correct for the dynamic ineﬃciency when dy-
namic eﬀects are suﬃciently important.4 When the subsidy to intermediate
purchase equals the optimal level, the government has implemented the first-
best policy. This policy is equivalent to SX = SI = (1− α). The spending
requirement in relation of output for this policy equals (1− α). This implies
that the required level of government spending may be very large.
This proposition motivates the question as to whether the steady-state
welfare eﬀect from a changing number of intermediate varieties under the
R&D subsidy can be larger than the eﬀect from moderating the monopoly
distortion under the production subsidy. If the answer is in the aﬃrmative,
it is relevant to analyze whether the total welfare eﬀect, i.e. when the tran-
sitional dynamics are incorporated in the analysis, may be larger under the
R&D subsidy than the production subsidy. In the following sections these
two questions are addressed.
4The steady-state value of r is determined by θ, g, and ρ, see (10). Instead of tracing
the results back to ρ and θ, I simply treat r as an exogenous parameter in the steady state
analysis.
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4 Steady-State Welfare
In this section I investigate whether the R&D subsidy can lead to higher
steady-state welfare than the production subsidy under restricted government
spending. The analysis is performed by comparing steady-state welfare
eﬀects of two experiments. In Experiment 1, the production subsidy is
implemented with no R&D subsidy, i.e. SX > 0, SI = 0, and the R&D
subsidy is implemented with no production subsidy in Experiment 2, i.e.
SX = 0, SI > 0. The analysis is carried out under the restriction that levels
of government spending in the two experiments are equal.
The requirement that the steady-state levels of government spending are
of similar magnitude in the two experiments, i.e. BI/BX = 1, implies
(1− α) gSI
((1− SI) (r − g) + αg)2
=
αSX (1− SX)−1/(1−α) (r − g)
(r − g + αg)2
. (21)
(21) are derived using (14), (15), (19), and (20). Furthermore, the steady-
state consumption levels are equal across the two experiments, i.e. cI/cX = 1,
if
1− SI
((1− SI) (r − g) + αg)2
=
(1− SX)−1/(1−α)
(r − g + αg)2
1− α2 − SX
1− α2 , (22)
holds. (22) is derived using (14), (15), (16), and (18). (21) and (22) are
complex function of SI and SX . When a SX-value is chosen, the values of
SI that ensure similar levels of government spending or consumption levels
under the two experiments are determined.
The two relationships are used to investigate whether the R&D subsidy
can lead to a higher steady-state welfare eﬀect than the production subsidy
under restricted government spending. More precisely, I investigate whether
cI/cX > 1 is a possible outcome for BI/BX = 1 and SI < (1− α). To do this
(21) and (22) are expressed as graphs in the (SX , SI)-space. cI/cX > 1 holds
for BI/BX = 1 if the BI/BX = 1-curve is located above the cI/cX = 1-curve.
Below I show that this is a possible outcome for the two cases; SX = SI → 0
and SI and SX > 0.
In the following steady-state consumption per capita is used interchange-
ably for steady-state welfare even though consumption is not synonymous
with welfare. It can be the case that the sacrifice in consumption that the
households have to suﬀer in the short- to median-run is too large for what
is socially optimal. The analysis, however, is carried out for relatively low
subsidy levels, implying that an increase in the subsidy will lead to an in-
crease in welfare. Furthermore, the transitional dynamics are determined in
the welfare evaluation in Section 5.
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4.1 Analysis for SX = SI → 0
The BI/BX = 1-curve is possibly located above the cI/cX = 1-curve for
SX = SI → 0:
Proposition 3 (a) The BI/BX = 1-curve and the cI/cX = 1-curve pass
through the origin.
(b) For (SX , SI) = (0, 0), the slope of the BI/BX = 1-curve is steeper that
the cI/cX = 1-curve when r/g > γ where
γ = 1 +
1 + α (1 + α) +
q
(1 + α (1 + α))2 + 4α (1 + α)
2 (1 + α)
Proof. It is easy to verify that the cI/cX = 1- and the BI/BX = 1-curves pass
through origin by setting SX = 0 in (21) and (22). This proves Proposition
3(a). Proposition 3(b) is proved in Appendix A4.¤
The main insight from Proposition 3 is that the introduction of a small
R&D subsidy may imply a larger impact on steady-state consumption than
the comparable production subsidy. In Figure 1, the condition from Propo-
sition 3b is illustrated for α ∈ (0, 1).
[Figure 1 about here]
The curve shows critical values of γ = r/g. When γ attains a value above
this limit, the steady-state welfare eﬀect of the R&D subsidy is above that
of the production subsidy for small subsidy levels. The production subsidy
generates a higher steady-state welfare eﬀect than the R&D subsidy below
the limit.
Since the steay-state rate of return equals r = θg + ρ, it is clear that
r/g = θ + ρ/g. Hence, the higher is θ or ρ and the lower is g, the higher is
γ = r/g and thereby the more likely is it that a small R&D subsidy results
in a larger welfare eﬀect than a production subsidy. This is consistent with
the result of Proposition 1, such that a larger γ = r/g generates a larger
dynamic gain from economic policy. Therefore, it is more likely that a small
R&D subsidy will generate a higher steady-state welfare eﬀect than a small
production subsidy that is directed at the static eﬀect.
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4.2 Analysis for SI , SX > 0
The BI/BX = 1-curve is possibly located above the cI/cX = 1-curve for
SX , SI > 0. The closed form solutions for the two curves are presented
in Appendixes A2 and A3. The two curves are positively sloping and are
possibly concave or convex. The functions for the two curves are highly
complex and it is not possible to describe the characteristics of these analyt-
ically. Therefore, the two curves are analyzed using numerical derivations
in this section. More precisely, the diﬀerence between the R&D subsidies
that satisfy BI/BX = 1 and cI/cX = 1 for a given value of the production
subsidy. If this diﬀerence is positive it means that it is more eﬃcient in
terms of welfare to subsidize R&D activities.
Three possible outcomes for the diﬀerence between the R&D subsidies
are presented in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Panel a presents the case where the production subsidy always leads to the
highest steady-state welfare eﬀect. Proposition 3b does not hold in this case.
When Proposition 3b applies, two outcome are possible as shown in Panels b
and c. Panel b presents the case where the R&D subsidy leads to a higher
steady-state welfare eﬀect for relatively low SX and the production subsidy
leads to a higher steady-state welfare eﬀect for relatively high values of SX .
Finally, Panel c presents the case where the R&D subsidy leads to a higher
steady-state welfare eﬀect for SI ∈ (0, (1− α)).
The main result established in this section is that the dynamic gain from
policy intervention is high compared to the static gain for a relatively high
rate of return, i.e., the dynamic gain is high when r/g is high. This implies
that R&D subsidies increase steady-state consumption more than production
subsidies under restricted government spending. The natural next step is
to investigate whether the R&D subsidy can generate higher welfare eﬀects
that the production subsidy when the transitional dynamics is taken into
account. This issue is addressed in the next section.
5 Total Welfare
To measure total welfare eﬀects under the diﬀerent policy instruments, the
transitional dynamics of the model is simulated using the ”Time-Elimination
Method”, see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1993). Furthermore, the
dynamic equivalent variation, EV , is applied to measure welfare eﬀects. For
a derivation of EV see Appendix A5.
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The transitional dynamics of the two subsidies are presented for the pa-
rameter values g= 0.5%, ρ = 0.055, θ = 2, and α = 0.5. The baseline
parameters are chosen in line with existing literature on economic growth,
see for example Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995, Chapter 5). The level of government spending is assumed
to equal 1% of initial final goods production. Hence, the analysis is car-
ried out under the restriction that levels of government spending in the two
experiments are equal. The eﬀect on consumption
¡
c0j = cj/L
¢
, the share
of labor in final goods production (uj), the interest rate (rj), patent price¡
pNj/L
¢
, the subsidy level (Sj), and the number of intermediate varieties¡
N 0j = Nj/L
¢
are shown. j indicates the applied subsidy.
[Figure 3 about here]
The figure confirms that the production subsidy generates static eﬀects only.
Panel b shows that the allocation of labor across sectors are unaﬀected by
the subsidy. The reason is that the incentive to invest in innovations are
unaﬀected implying an unchanged rate of return to investments, see Panel c.
Consequently, the consumption profile of this subsidy is described as a one
time increase in consumption at time zero.
The R&D subsidy generates dynamic eﬀects because the incentive to
investing in R&D increased. It is evident from Panel c, that rate of return
increases on impact. This reflects that the patent price falls when R&D is
subsidized, see (7). The higher incentive to innovate implies reallocation
of labor out of final goods production and into R&D implying that uX falls.
Consumption falls on impact when labor is reallocated to R&D activities but
increases over time to a new and higher consumption level in the medium and
long run as a consequence of the increasing number of intermediate varieties.
The issue of interest is whether the consumption profile of the subsidy
to R&D leads to higher welfare than the production subsidy. To evaluate
whether this may be the case, the dynamic equivalent variation is presented
in Table 1 for combinations of the parameter values g = 0.5%, 1%, and 2%,
ρ = 0.03, 0.055, and 0.08, θ = 1.001 and 2, and α= 0.333 and 0.5.
[Table 1 about here]
It is evident that the subsidy to R&D may generate a larger eﬀect on total
welfare than the R&D subsidy when the spending equals one percent of final
output. For the baseline experiment (g = 0.5%, ρ = 0.055, θ = 2 and
α = 0.5), the total welfare eﬀect of the R&D subsidy is 4.29, i.e. EVSI . This
welfare eﬀect is 1.70 times larger than the welfare eﬀect for the production
subsidy, i.e. EVSI/EVSX .
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According to Proposition 1, the R&D subsidy leads to relative large
steady-state welfare eﬀects for low g, high ρ and high θ values. It is seen
from Table 1 that the total welfare eﬀect is relatively large for high values of
ρ and low values of g. For these parameters, the result from the steady-state
analysis carries over to the total welfare analysis. However, the steady-state
eﬀect of θ does not carry over. Based on the steady-state analysis, it is
expected that an increase in θ increases EV of the R&D subsidy in relation
to the production subsidy. However, a higher θ tend to reduce the relative
size of EV for the R&D subsidy. The understanding of this result is that
households are less willing to vary consumption for high θ. This implies that
the sacrifice in consumption that the households have to suﬀer in the short-
to median-run under the R&D subsidy lead to relatively a large negative
eﬀect on welfare. An exemption is for g = 0.02 and ρ = 0.03 where the
steay-state eﬀect of changing θ as mentioned above dominates.
The last column in Table 1 presents the total welfare eﬀect of the subsidy
to intermediate purchase. This subsidy is a combination of the production
subsidy and the R&D subsidy. It is evident that this combined subsidy al-
ways lead to a lower welfare eﬀect that the two focussed instruments. This
suggests that the government should concentrate on correcting one distortion
at a time. This result is surprising since by using the subsidy to interme-
diate purchase, the government could implement the first-best policy under
unrestricted government spending.
Table 2 presents the welfare eﬀects for diﬀerent spending levels. The
welfare eﬀects are presented for two scenarios, the baseline scenario and g =
0.5%, ρ = 0.08, θ = 1.001, and α = 0.5.
[Table 2 about here]
For the baseline scenario, it is seen that the total welfare eﬀect of the R&D
subsidy exceeds that of the production subsidy by most when the government
spending is low. When government spending increases, the advantage of
using the R&D subsidy is reduced. When the government spending is equal
to or above 3% the government should use the production subsidy. For the
second scenario, the government should use the R&D subsidy, even when the
government spending is as high as 5% of final output.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that it may be optimal from a welfare perspective to
directly subsidize R&D activities when the source of R&D distortions mainly
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originates from the surplus appropriability problem. This result holds when
two conditions are fulfilled: (1) dynamic eﬀects are important relative to
static eﬀects and (2) governments spend less resources than the required
eﬀort for correcting completely for R&D distortions.
The applied model is a simple semi-endogenous growth model, see for
example Jones (1995). Monopoly power generates a distortion in pricing of
intermediate goods, which calls for policy intervention. Subsidies to the pro-
duction of intermediate goods and subsidies to R&D activities are analyzed.
The former has a direct eﬀect on the distortion of monopoly pricing. The
other instrument is direct support of R&D activities and covers part of R&D
costs. This instrument has no direct eﬀect on the distortion of monopoly
pricing.
This main question of the paper is whether the R&D subsidy generates a
higher welfare eﬀect than a production subsidy under restricted government
spending. This is found to be the case, suggesting that the government
may be able to generate higher welfare by focusing entirely on the dynamic
ineﬃciency.
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A The Solution to the Model
The solution of the model is given by (5), (7), (10), (11) and the transversality
condition limt→∞ [atft] = 0, where at is the co-state variable associated to
financial capital. Without subsidies, the equilibrium can be expressed as:
gc = (r − ρ) /θ
gN = δ (1− u)L/N
c =
¡
1− α2
¢
α2α/(1−α)uN
where
r = (1− (1− α) u) δL/N
and L grows with a constant exogenous growth rate, g.
In the main text, two experiments are investigated. In Experiment 1,
the direct instrument is implemented with no R&D subsidy, i.e. SX > 0,
SI = 0, and the R&D subsidy is implemented with no direct instrument
in Experiment 2, i.e. SX = 0, SI > 0. The steady-state equilibria under
Experiments 1 and 2 appear from (14), (15), (16) and (18).
A.1 Stability of the Steady State Equilibrium
The Jacobian is derived by linear approximation of system of dynamic equa-
tion around the steay-state values of c0 = c/L and N 0 = N/L. This results
in the following system:
∙ .
c
0
N˙ 0
¸
= A
∙
c0 − c0∗
N 0 −N 0∗
¸
where:
A =
∙
a11 a12
a21 a22
¸
=
∙ −(1−α)δu∗
θN∗
(2(1−α)u∗−1)δc∗
θN∗2
−δu∗/c∗ −g + δu∗/N∗
¸
.
The determinant of A can be expressed as:
|A| = − δu
∗
θN∗
µ
δ
N∗
− (1− α)
µ
δu∗
N∗
+ g
¶¶
(23)
For stability of the system the determinant of the Jacobian has to be neg-
ative. By substituting for steay-state values, the determinant is rewritten
to − (r − g) (r − g + αg) /θ. Consequently, the steay-state equilibrium is
saddle-path stable. It can be shown that the equilibria with subsidies im-
plemented are saddle-path stable.
21
A.2 cI/cX = 1-curve
The function cI/cX = 1, presented in (22) has two possible solutions:
1− S−I =
1− 2q (SX) (r − g)αg − (1− 4q (SX) (r − g)αg)0.5
2q (SX) (r − g)2
and
1− S+I =
1− 2q (SX) (r − g)αg + (1− 4q (SX) (r − g)αg)0.5
2q (SX) (r − g)2
(24)
where
q (SX) =
(1− SX)−1/(1−α)
(r − g + αg)2
1− α2 − SX
1− α2 .
It can be shown that the relevant solution is 1 − S+I . This is proven by
showing that 1 − S−I < α, implying that SI > 1 − α, which is irrelevant in
the analysis because R&D is over-subsidized in this case.
The slope of the cI/cX = 1-curve is derived using (24):
∂SI
∂SX
=
(1− SX) q0 (SX) /q (SX)p
1− 4q (SX) (r − g)αg
(25)
where
q0 (SX)
q (SX)
=
1
1− SX
µ
1
1− α −
1− SX
1− α2 − SX
¶
.
The slope of SI (SX) is positive for SX < (1− α).
A.3 BI/BX = 1-curve
The function BI/BX = 1, presented in (21) has two possible solutions each:
1− S−I =
− (1 + 2p (SX) (r − g)αg)− (1 + 4p (SX) (r − g) (r − g + αg))0.5
2p (SX) (r − g)2
and
1− S+I =
− (1 + 2p (SX) (r − g)αg) + (1 + 4p (SX) (r − g) (r − g + αg))0.5
2p (SX) (r − g)2
(26)
where
p (SX) =
SX (1− SX)−1/(1−α)
(r − g + αg)2
r − g
g
α
1− α
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It is clear that the relevant solution is 1−S+I , since SI would otherwise exceed
1. 1− S+I can be shown to be positive for all parameter choices.
The slope of the BI/BX = 1 is derived using (26):
∂SI
∂SX
=
SIp
0 (SX) /p (SX)p
1 + 4p (SX) (r − g) (r − g + αg)
(27)
since
p0 (SX)
p (SX)
=
1
SX
+
α
1− α
1
1− SX
.
The slope of SI (SX) is always positive.
A.4 Proposition 3
The slope of the cI/cX = 1-curve for SX = SI = 0 equals
∂SI
∂SX |cI/cX=1
=
α
1− α2
r − g + αg
r − g − αg ,
which is derived using (25), whereas the slope of the BI/BX = 1-curve for
SX = SI = 0 equals
∂SI
∂SX |BI/BX=1
=
α (r − g)
(1− α) g .
The slope is derived from (27) using (21) to solve for the limit value of
SI/SX .
Define r = γg. The slope of the BI/BX = 1-curve is equal to the slope
of the cI/cX = 1-curve for
(1 + α) (γ − 1)2 − (1 + α (1 + α)) (γ − 1)− α = 0.
Two roots solves each of this equation. The lower root is negative and
therefore not relevant, since r > 2g according to the transversality condition.
When γ > γ, the slope of the BI/BX = 1-curve larger than the slope of the
cI/cX = 1-curve. This proves Proposition 3b. The critical γ value, i.e., γ,
for which the slopes of the two curves equal is presented in the proposition.
A.5 Dynamic Equivalent Variation
The intertemporal budget constraint:
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠Ctdt = H0 + F0 −B0
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is used with the Euler condition for consumption to express:
c0 =
1
Ω0
(H0 + F0 −B0)
where
H0 =
∞Z
0
wtLt exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠ dt =
∞Z
0
wt
Lt
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
(rv − 2g) dv
⎞
⎠ dt
F0 = PN0N0
and
B0 =
∞Z
0
Bt exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠ dt = b0
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
(rv − 2g) dv
⎞
⎠ dt.
H0 is the present value of labor income, F0 is non-human wealth at time 0,
and B0 is the present value of tax payments.
Ω0 =
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
(θ − 1) rv + ρ− θg
θ
dv
⎞
⎠ dt
By using the expression for c0 and the Euler condition for consumption, the
utility integral, the indirect intertemporal utility function can be formulated
as:
U =
µ
Ωθ0 (H0 + F0 −B0)
1−θ − 1
ρ− g
¶
/ (1− θ) .
The dynamic equivalent variation is defined as follows:µ¡
ΩM0
¢θ ¡
HM0 + F
M
0 + EV
¢1−θ − 1
ρ− g
¶
/ (1− θ)
=
µ¡
ΩS0
¢θ ¡
HS0 + F
S
0 −BS0
¢1−θ − 1
ρ− g
¶
/ (1− θ) .
The superscript S denotes the case when a subsidy is implemented. M de-
notes the initial situation described by laissez-faire steady-state equilibrium.
This yields the equivalent variation:
EV =
µ
ΩS0
ΩM0
¶θ/(1−θ) ¡
HS0 + F
S
0 −BS0
¢
−
¡
HM0 + F
M
0
¢
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Figure 1: Critical γ as defined in Proposition 3b 
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Figure 2: The SI(cI/cX=1) - SI(BI/BX=1)-curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Panel a:  α = 0.5, g = 0.02, γ = 2.2, Panel b:  α = 0.5, g = 0.02, γ = 2.45, Panel c:  α = 0.5, g = 0.02, , 
γ = 2.7.  Critical γ value as defined in Proposition 3b equals approximately 2.40 
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Table 1:  Welfare Effects of Different Scenarios. 
(Government budget equals one percent of initial final output). 
Parameter values Equivalent variation 
g ρ θ α EVSI EVSI/EVSX EVSI/EVSXD 
0.005 0.03 2 0.5 3.08 1.22 1.86 
0.005 0.03 2 0.333 5.48 1.76 2.92 
0.005 0.03 1.001 0.5 4.48 1.78 2.47 
0.005 0.03 1.001 0.333 7.28 2.34 3.25 
0.005 0.055 2 0.5 4.29 1.70 2.61 
0.005 0.055 2 0.333 6.74 2.17 3.64 
0.005 0.055 1.001 0.5 4.50 1.78 2.51 
0.005 0.055 1.001 0.333 9.38 3.02 4.22 
0.005 0.08 2 0.5 4.75 1.89 2.90 
0.005 0.08 2 0.333 7.35 2.37 3.99 
0.005 0.08 1.001 0.5 6.72 2.67 3.74 
0.005 0.08 1.001 0.333 7.92 2.55 3.58 
0.01 0.03 2 0.5 2.47 0.98 1.46 
0.01 0.03 2 0.333 4.11 1.32 2.12 
0.01 0.03 1.001 0.5 2.75 1.09 1.50 
0.01 0.03 1.001 0.333 4.68 1.51 2.04 
0.01 0.055 2 0.5 3.29 1.31 1.98 
0.01 0.055 2 0.333 5.34 1.72 2.83 
0.01 0.055 1.001 0.5 4.32 1.72 2.38 
0.01 0.055 1.001 0.333 7.03 2.26 3.12 
0.01 0.08 2 0.5 3.85 1.53 2.33 
0.01 0.08 2 0.333 6.12 1.97 3.28 
0.01 0.08 1.001 0.5 5.29 2.10 2.93 
0.01 0.08 1.001 0.333 8.39 2.70 3.76 
0.02 0.03 2 0.5 1.88 0.74 1.09 
0.02 0.03 2 0.333 3.14 1.01 1.55 
0.02 0.03 1.001 0.5 1.51 0.60 0.81 
0.02 0.03 1.001 0.333 2.68 0.86 1.13 
0.02 0.055 2 0.5 2.40 0.95 1.42 
0.02 0.055 2 0.333 3.99 1.28 2.04 
0.02 0.055 1.001 0.5 2.65 1.05 1.44 
0.02 0.055 1.001 0.333 4.48 1.44 1.94 
0.02 0.08 2 0.5 2.84 1.13 1.70 
0.02 0.08 2 0.333 4.68 1.51 2.44 
0.02 0.08 1.001 0.5 3.50 1.39 1.92 
0.02 0.08 1.001 0.333 5.81 1.87 2.55 
Note: EVSI is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the innovation subsidy 
is implemented; EVSX is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the subsidy 
to intermediate production is implemented, and EVSXD is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to 
wealth at time zero when the subsidy to intermediate purchase is implemented. 
Table 2:  Welfare Effects of Different Scenarios 
Parameter values Equivalent variation 
g ρ θ α budget EVSI EVSI/EVSX 
0.005 0.08 1.001 0.5 0.005 4.61 5.05 
    0.01 6.72 3.74 
    0.02 9.08 2.59 
    0.03 10.37 2.02 
    0.04 11.09 1.66 
    0.05 11.45 1.40 
0.005 0.055 2 0.5 0.005 2.82 2.18 
    0.01 4.29 1.70 
    0.015 5.24 1.42 
    0.02 5.88 1.23 
    0.025 6.33 1.09 
    0.03 6.63 0.97 
Note: EVSI is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the innovation subsidy 
is implemented, and EVSX is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the 
subsidy to intermediate production is implemented. budget denotes government budget as a percent of 
initial final output. 
